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Causation By Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should 
Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo 
 




 The Supreme Court is about to hear Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo, a case in which the 
Ninth Circuit significantly liberalized the “loss causation” standards applicable to federal securities 
litigation. In response to a companion article by Professor Merritt Fox, which favors such a liberalization 
and even the abandonment of loss causation as a necessary element, Professor Coffee argues that any 
change in causation standards that permits a plaintiff to escape showing a decline in the security’s stock 
market price attributable to the material misstatement or omission gives rise to perverse incentives, which 
would likely result in the award of phantom losses that may have been caused instead by other factors, such 
as a market bubble. More generally, he argues that the securities class action against the corporate 
defendant in cases of secondary market stock drops appears to serve little legitimate function, advancing 
neither compensatory nor deterrent ends. Instead, such actions against the corporation (as opposed to 
actions against gatekeepers, controlling persons or the corporation in the primary market setting) 
principally effect inefficient wealth transfers among largely diversified shareholders. Given the legal and 
other transaction costs involved, shareholders appear likely to be net losers from such actions. As a result, 
he concludes that further minimization of the causation requirement should await policy clarification of the 
role of the “fraud on the market” action against a non-trading issuer defendant. 
 
 Over a quarter of a century ago, Judge Henry Friendly coined the term “fraud by 
hindsight” in upholding the dismissal of a proposed securities class action.1 As he 
explained, it was too simple to look backward with full knowledge of actual events and 
allege what should have been earlier disclosed by a public corporation in its SEC filings. 
Because hindsight has 20/20 vision, plaintiffs could not fairly “seize upon disclosures” in 
later reports, he ruled, to show what defendants should have disclosed earlier.2  
 Today, a parallel concept – “causation by presumption” – is before the Supreme 
Court, and it too deserves to be rejected. At issue is whether a loss that never actually 
occurred in the real world – but arguably would have if other events had not intervened or 
if full corrective disclosure had been made – can support a Rule 10b-5 cause of action 
against a public corporation. The key problem with such a hypothetical determination of 
loss involves the limited institutional competence of judges and juries to infer losses. 
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Generally, markets determine the loss, and the judicial system (judges and juries) 
allocates it among the parties to a litigation. This makes sense; markets know best what 
information to value, and the legal factfinder can best make the normative judgments 
about the defendant’s requisite culpability and relative fault.3  
 Yet, under Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4 the case now before the 
Supreme Court, the judicial system (and typically the jury) would potentially determine 
both. Losses uncorroborated by any form of market reaction to the discovery that material 
information had been misstated or omitted could be awarded. For example, in the absence 
of such a market reaction, the jury could determine that the stock price was inflated – 
even though the market price of the stock either never declined or instead declined for 
entirely unrelated reasons. Broudo’s approach has been formalized by my able colleague 
Professor Merritt Fox in his companion article. Under his proposed methodology, once 
“the plaintiff successfully pleads that the misstatement is material, there would be for 
pleading purposes a presumption that the misstatement inflated the purchase price.”5 This 
is what I term “causation by presumption,” because its net effect is to eliminate any real 
obligation to show a causal connection between a material misrepresentation or omission 
and any actual stock market decline. This premise that because material adverse 
information was not disclosed, the price must therefore have been inflated is, however, 
highly questionable. That a jury finds a fact to be material does not mean that the market 
would have given it weight. To say this is not to reject efficient market theory, but only to 
recognize that the factfinder’s conclusion is not the judgment of that market. 
 More generally, permitting such hypothetical loss determinations without 
corroboration from any actual market movement expands the role of courts and juries 
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beyond their historical domain (which was to allocate losses that demonstrably existed) 
and shrinks the role of the market. Ultimately, markets, rather than courts, are better at 
determining the extent of the loss, if any, that has occurred, even if the market reaction 
may sometimes mask a possible loss because of offsetting positive and negative 
developments. Part I of this comment will examine the practical implications of Broudo’s 
approach to causation.6 
 Part II then turns to Broudo’s policy implications for securities class actions and 
shareholder welfare. Rule 10b-5 class actions tend disproportionately to be secondary 
market class actions in which the defendant corporation has neither bought nor sold its 
own shares during the relevant period. Within this context, the need for a market 
corroboration of a loss seems strongest because such a securities class action essentially 
pits one class of shareholders (those who traded within the class period) against all other 
shareholders. Inherently, in the secondary market context, such actions generate wealth 
transfers from the latter class of generally non-culpable shareholders to the former class.  
 Why we should wish to maximize the number and amount of these intra-
shareholder wealth transfers is a question that seems to have escaped serious policy 
debate. But such a debate is needed because these transfers seem likely to produce net 
losses in the real world, once the considerable transactions costs extracted by the legal 
profession are subtracted. Broudo does not create this problem, but it exacerbates it. Thus, 
although Professor Fox incisively explains the incongruence between traditional reliance 
theories and the context of secondary trading in an efficient market, his analysis ducks 
the real policy issue:  namely, the legitimacy of maximizing wealth transfers among 
generally diversified shareholders. Until this issue is placed at the forefront of any policy 
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analysis, discussions of presumptions and burdens of proof merely rearrange the deck 
chairs on the Titanic. 
 In fairness to Professor Fox, his doctrinal history is succinct and accurate, and he 
clearly demonstrates that transaction causation is logically irrelevant to this open market 
context (and in fact courts have quietly dispensed with it). But his attempt to dispense 
similarly with loss causation takes him, I believe, a bridge too far. Eliminating loss 
causation (or replacing it with a presumption) forces the corporate defendant to act as an 
insurer who must compensate shareholders who traded within the class period for losses 
that may have only a tenuous relationship with any misrepresentation it made. The cost of 
such insurance is not only expensive, but it provides no real benefit for diversified 
shareholders who fall into both classes and thus wind up effectively transferring wealth 
from one pocket to another (minus considerable legal costs). For all these reasons, little 
policy justification exists to further liberalize the standards applicable to secondary 
market Rule 10b-5 litigation against a non-trading issuer. 
 Part III will turn to doctrinal and statutory issues. The approach of both Broudo 
and Professor Fox conflict with the methodology that the Supreme Court has laid out for 
construing Rule 10b-5’s contours:  namely, as an implied cause of action, Rule 10b-5 
must mirror the most closely comparable express cause of action. In fact, the most closely 
comparable provisions define loss causation so as to focus exclusively on the 
“depreciation in value” of the security, thereby implying that initial price inflation at the 
time of purchase without subsequent “depreciation in value” is insufficient.7 In addition, 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”) makes proof of loss 
causation mandatory in a Rule 10b-5 action, and it clearly assigned the burden of proof 
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on that issue to the plaintiff. This allocation of the burden is frustrated, however, if courts 
recognize a presumption of causation based only on a proper pleading of materiality.  
 Current law also draws an entirely sensible distinction between the primary and 
secondary market contexts, placing the burden on the plaintiff of proving loss causation 
in the secondary market context, but shifting it to the defendant to disprove loss causation 
in the primary market context.8 This distinction would be frustrated if merely pleading 
that a misstatement “inflated” the issuer’s stock price could suffice to satisfy the loss 
causation standard in the secondary market context (because such proof will clearly not 
work in the primary market context).9 
I. What’s At Stake in Broudo 
 In Broudo, the defendant Dura Pharmaceuticals announced lower than forecast 
earnings in February, 1998 and suffered a very sharp drop in its stock price (47% in one 
day).10 This was the only stock price decline that plaintiffs alleged (or that otherwise 
appears in the record). Plaintiffs did allege, however, that materially false misstatements 
were made over an approximately nine month period from April, 1997 to January 1998, 
which preceded the February 1998 earnings surprise. These misstatements related to an 
asthma medication delivery device that Dura was developing. Ultimately, in November, 
1998, Dura announced that the Federal Drug Administration had refused to approve this 
product, but plaintiffs did not allege that the market declined in response to this 
announcement.11 
 Although the district court dismissed the complaint in Broudo for failure to plead 
“loss causation,”12 the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff need not plead any 
causal connection between the misstatement and a subsequent decline in price, but only 
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need plead “that the price at the time of purchase was overstated and sufficient indication 
of the cause.”13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue.14 
 Professor Fox believes that the Ninth Circuit got it right. Because the market was 
efficient, Dura’s allegedly false statement “can be presumed to have inflated the price 
paid for its shares.”15 “Thus,” he concludes, “the pleadings are satisfactory as to 
causation.”16 In short, the plaintiff need only plead price inflation, and not that the stock 
price subsequently fell. From an economic perspective, Professor Fox’s theory is 
coherent:  if you make a material misstatement, it must inflate the market price and so the 
shareholders purchasing at that inflated price are injured. But from a legal and 
institutional perspective, this presumption is more suspect, and in any event the law of 
fraud has never condensed to this simple and skeletal a formula.17  
 Initially, it is important to focus on the incentive effects created by this theory that 
the plaintiff need only allege price inflation. Under such an interpretation of Broudo, 
materiality subsumes causation. Once materiality is shown, some price inflation is to be 
presumed. As a result, the practical impact of this rule would be to give plaintiff’s 
attorneys a strong and seemingly perverse incentive to search the stock market for 
significant stock price declines and then seek to allege that some material information 
had been withheld or misstated – even if, as in Broudo, other developments (i.e., the 
earnings shortfall in that case) seemed to explain better the stock price decline. 
 To illustrate, assume that Foreign Corporation, whose stock is actively traded in 
the U.S. market, is suddenly nationalized or simply shut down by its home country, and 
its price falls from $50 per share to zero. The proximate cause of this loss may seem 
obvious, but if plaintiffs can plausibly allege that Foreign Corporation had inflated its 
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financial statements so that its true intrinsic value was only $30 per share at the time that 
class members purchased its stock, then, under Broudo, they can sue for this $20 worth of 
inflation – even though there is no market corroboration that any misstatement would 
have had such an impact. To be sure, some allocation of the loss would be necessary 
between the non-fraudulent causes of the stock price decline and the alleged material 
misstatements or omissions. But this would not need to be done until one reached the 
damages stage of the action. In the real world of securities class action litigation, this 
stage is seldom reached. 
 The practical impact of eliminating any requirement that the plaintiff plead a 
causal connection to a subsequent stock decline is that many more cases would survive 
dismissal at the pleading stage, because the plaintiff’s attorney would only have to plead 
materiality and scienter. At trial, the plaintiff’s attorney could plausibly assert that some 
portion of the stock drop was attributable to the market’s discovery of some or all of the 
undisclosed or misstated material facts (even if most of the stock drop seemed more 
attributable to a fully disclosed cause). Or, alternatively, the plaintiff could assert that the 
stock price was still inflated.18 While Professor Fox makes clear that he would not allow 
damages without some actual decline in the stock’s value, Broudo is far less clear and 
might allow a recovery even in the absence of a stock market decline.  
 In practice, the most likely scenario under Broudo would be something like this:  
A high-tech company fails to disclose that a key patent may not be valid and enforceable 
because it infringes on that of a rival company. Plaintiffs assert that the stock, which has 
long traded at $100 per share, is really worth only $70 because of this problem. But 
before any disclosure is made, all of the company’s senior management dies in a crash of 
 - 9 -
their corporate jet, and, without them, this start-up company cannot continue. The stock 
price falls to $10.19 Alternatively, there may be no plane crash and instead newspaper 
stories reveal that the company faces some patent litigation; in response, the market price 
responds partially, falling only to $90 per share. Still, plaintiffs assert that because the 
full truth has not been revealed, the stock is still inflated, and its actual value is only $70. 
 Either way, how should we answer Professor Fox’s claim that the shareholders 
who bought at $100 were truly injured at the time of their purchase by the company’s 
failure to disclose a material problem with its patents and thus they should be able to 
recover the difference between $100 and the stock’s alleged “intrinsic value” of $70 – 
without showing any market correction attributable to the misstatement or omission? 
Several different answers can be given that all reiterate the basic theme that the loss here 
is simply too speculative and indefinite in the absence of any evidence that the market 
considered the stock to have been overvalued because of the alleged patent problem. First, 
even if judges and juries simply are competent to determine the materiality of the 
misstatement, they cannot reliably measure its financial impact in the absence of some 
market evaluation of the corrected disclosure. Was the material nondisclosure worth $10 
or $70? Juries generally do not have a clue. Second, even if material adverse information 
was not disclosed (as in the foregoing patent hypothetical), material positive information 
may have also been withheld for proprietary reasons, so that the $100 purchase price did 
in fact reflect intrinsic value (or even fell below intrinsic value). This is not implausible, 
because corporations have an incentive to withhold proprietary information from their 
competitors.20 Third, the nondisclosure of the patent problem went to a risk that might or 
might not materialize. In fact, if it had been disclosed, assume that the market price 
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would have sunk temporarily to $70, but ultimately it would have rebounded to $100, or 
more, when the company won the patent litigation. Why should non-selling shareholders 
be compensated for only a temporary decline in their corporation’s stock price that never 
affected them?  
 Finally and most importantly, the stock may have been inflated, but the real cause 
was a market bubble.21 The plaintiff shareholders may have purchased in the secondary 
market in the aftermath of an IPO, when the stock price soared, pushed upward by an 
overheated market.22 Thus, the price inflation may not be attributable to any misstatement, 
even if a material misstatement were made. Hence, to hold the issuer liable on these facts 
is to make it an insurer for the market’s “irrational exuberance.” But again, this results in 
a system of extraordinarily expensive self-insurance for diversified investors, which they 
clearly would not purchase if given the choice. Endless variations on all these themes can 
be posed, but the major point here is that the jury’s inference of what the market price 
would have been had the misstatement or omission not been made involves a speculative 
judgment in which we can have little confidence. 
 Professor Fox characterizes my objections as “evidentiary” in nature and adds that 
I appear “to have little trust in the ability of the judge at summary judgment and the jury 
at trial to deal reliably” with these issues.23 He then suggests that judges and juries can 
deal “sensibly” with these issues.24 This is, of course, an empirical issue. The latest data 
shows that on a percentage basis few securities class actions are dismissed before trial 
and that even this low rate has dropped significantly since the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.25 While dismissal rates vary significantly by Circuit, in the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, which have the highest volumes of securities class action litigation, only 8% and 
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6%, respectively, of all securities class actions were dismissed within two years of the 
action’s filing.26 In short, even with today’s strict rules (in most Circuits) on loss 
causation, only a low percentage of securities class actions are dismissed, and Professor 
Fox would liberalize the pleading standard so that even fewer would be dismissed. This is 
not a small point. Procedurally, courts have only limited opportunities to dismiss an 
action before trial, and Professor Fox’s proposal would eliminate one of these. Nor is 
summary judgment an adequate substitute, because if there are triable factual issues, the 
court has no discretion and must let the action proceed to trial. 
 The differences between Professor Fox and myself may well boil down, on the 
operational level, to my insistence that procedure counts. From his ex ante perspective, it 
can be argued that dropping loss causation as a necessary element in the liability equation 
does not truly change much because the plaintiff still must prove damages. Arguably, the 
issues that are today addressed in most Circuits under the heading of causation would 
instead simply be postponed to the later stage at which damages are determined (where 
the plaintiff would still bear the burden of proof). This might be correct in theory if cases 
where actually litigated at this damage determination stage, but they are not. Cases that 
survive pre-trial dismissal tend to be settled. Hence, any proposal to substitute a 
presumption of causation for the traditional loss causation rule (as Professor Fox 
proposes) substantially tilts the playing field to the disadvantage of defendants. Delaying 
the issue of causation until the damages phase realistically means (i) that issue of 
causation would be at least partially transferred from the court’s control to the jury’s 
discretion, and (ii) the defendants would lose their current opportunity for a pre-trial 
screening of the case by the court. Thus, both in terms of timing and the allocation of 
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responsibility between the judge and the jury, Broudo’s rule (and, even more so, 
Professor Fox’s codification of it) are adverse to defendants and will raise the settlement 
value of securities class actions. 
 The full scope of the problems that Broudo raises comes into clearest focus only 
when we consider the prospect that multiple plaintiffs, each relying on different public 
statements made at different times, could all assert that the corporation’s stock price was 
overvalued because of material misrepresentations made at or prior to the time they 
purchased – but that this price inflation was never detected (or at least fully corrected) by 
the market. To illustrate, assume that a large block of shares in Corporation X was 
purchased at three different times during 2004:  (i) by a state public pension fund on 
April 1, 2004 at a price of $60 per share, which price was allegedly inflated because 
Corporation X had failed to disclose that it used an improper accounting principle in 
determining its 2003 earnings (which results had been publicly released at that point); (ii) 
by a mutual fund on June 1, 2004, also at $60 per share, but a time when Corporation X 
allegedly knew, but had not disclosed, that it was subject to material environmental 
liabilities that were likely to be asserted eventually; and (iii) by a hedge fund on October 
15, 2004, also at $60 per share, at a time when Corporation X allegedly knew, but had not 
disclosed, that its principal customer had terminated their long-term exclusive dealing 
agreement. Throughout this period and thereafter, Corporation X’s stock price remains 
stable at $60 – until April 1, 2005 when it suddenly falls to $40 per share. Each of these 
investors sues in a different court (two in federal court, and the third in state court), each 
alleging that the stock price had been inflated at the time of their purchase. Under Broudo, 
all they need allege is materiality and scienter. Each could win its own proceeding, each 
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potentially recovering the full $20 difference per share (or more, if they convinced the 
jury that the market had not yet fully corrected the inflation). Even if the defendant 
introduced persuasive evidence that some extrinsic event (i.e., a change in interest rates 
or a world crisis) had caused the market decline from $60 to $40 per share, plaintiffs 
could still reply that the latent price inflation in their case still remained.27 
 Beyond the practical problems in such litigation, the greater problem in applying 
“efficient market” reasoning to the context of securities litigation may be that lawyers 
and economists often mean different things when they use the same words. An economist 
knows that an efficient market will respond to all new material information, incorporating 
it into price immediately. But a lawyer knows that the concept of “materiality,” as it is 
applied in courts, is broad and liberal. A “material” fact is one as to which: 
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote.”28 
 
This is an expansive test that asks the jury to determine if the information is “important” 
to a rational decision. Such a definition is broader than the economic definition of 
materiality, which typically focuses on future discounted cash flows. Facts so found to be 
material under this legal standard may or may not move the market. Thus, a jury’s 
determination that material facts were not disclosed does not necessarily imply that there 
has been price inflation; nor should such inflation be presumed. Because the two 
professions have different understandings of the same term, it is dangerous to presume 
that a legal conclusion necessarily has real world implication for markets. 
II. A Policy Perspective on the Secondary Market Securities Class Action 
 The context of secondary market trading is very different from that of the primary 
market in which the corporation issues shares to investors who purchase from it. Because 
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of the long-established separation of ownership and control in the United States, the vast 
majority of the stock in “public” companies will be owned by dispersed shareholders 
holding relatively small percentage stakes, with this ownership being divided 
approximately equally between institutional investors and retail investors. When a 
securities class action is brought against a public corporation that has not, itself, sold or 
purchased its securities (i.e., the typical secondary market context), the action is brought 
on behalf of shareholders (and former shareholders) who purchased the stock during the 
“class period” (i.e., the time period during which the market was allegedly affected by 
material misinformation). Any judgment or settlement in this action will be borne by the 
corporation (and thus indirectly by its current shareholders).29 As a result, securities 
litigation in this context inherently results in a wealth transfer between two classes of 
public shareholders, neither of whom is necessarily culpable. Worse still, even if we 
assume that fraud was present, the beneficiaries of the fraud are the persons who sold at 
inflated prices – the selling shareholders – and they escape without incurring any cost 
when liability is later imposed on their former corporation. 
 Equally perverse are the implications that flow from the fact that most investors 
are diversified. Hence, they will belong to both the plaintiff class that sues and the 
residual shareholder class that bears the cost of the litigation. Either they will have 
purchased stock at times that are both inside and outside the class period, or, viewed in 
the aggregate, they will own stock in many corporations that are the subject of securities 
class actions, sometimes being a shareholder within the class period and sometimes not. 
As a result, at least in the aggregate, diversified investors are making wealth transfers to 
themselves, shifting money, as it were, from one pocket to the other – minus, of course, 
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the considerable transactions costs that both sides pay to the legal profession. Indeed, if 
the legal and other costs borne by the corporation are added to the fees and expenses 
received by the plaintiff’s attorney, this sum on average may well exceed the net recovery 
to the class.30  At a minimum, it is clear that recovery rates in securities class actions are 
extremely modest: 2.8% of investor losses in 2003, up from 2.7% in 2002.31 In short, as a 
mechanism for delivering compensation, securities class actions are far from successful 
and may inflict increased compensatory losses on shareholders. 
 This is not to deny that there could be deterrent benefits from such class actions,32 
but again these benefits should not be idealized or assumed. Insurance typically protects 
the individual defendants (and often the corporation as well), and this cost again falls on 
shareholders. Also, if only 2.7% to 2.8% of investor losses are recovered on average, this 
cost may be easily absorbed by those who have an incentive to inflate the company’s 
financial statements. Most importantly, for deterrence to work, the costs must fall either 
on the culpable or at least on those who are the best cost avoiders – that is, those who can 
take effective precautions to minimize the risks. As a practical matter, this means that 
actions directed against corporate managers, controlling shareholders, auditors, 
underwriters or other gatekeepers should have some desirable deterrent effect, but when 
the liability simply falls on the corporation, as the residual risk bearer, the deterrent effect 
is dissipated. 
 Finally, there is the problem of error and its costs. When liability is imposed for a 
loss that was not causally related to a misstatement or omission made by the defendant, 
the law generates only an unfocused deterrence, and a windfall is awarded to one class of 
shareholders (typically, the selling shareholders) at the expense of other shareholders. 
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Such mistakes are not costless to shareholders, because the defendants who pay will 
demand a risk premium in the future before they again serve as an auditor, underwriter or 
other gatekeeper. Also, such deterrence may induce overly conservative financial 
reporting and/or earnings management that is intended to reduce stock price volatility and 
thereby minimize the risk of future liability. 
 For these reasons, I find Professor Fox’s analysis too facile when he argues that 
fraud-on-the market actions “deter corporate misstatements” and thereby increase “share 
price accuracy.”33 To be sure, they could do so, but the impact of his proposal to drop the 
loss causation requirement may be more to unfocus deterrence. To the extent that 
causation is presumed based only on a showing of materiality, the likelihood grows that 
cases will settle for substantial recoveries where the actual cause of the stock market 
decline was unrelated. The costs of these settlements would fall like a tax on all 
shareholders, and such unfocused deterrence may do more harm than good. No policy 
rationale seems discernible that justifies liberalizing the standards applicable to causation 
in order to encourage this type of litigation (as opposed to actions against the truly 
responsible actors). 
III. The Battle in the Doctrinal Trenches:  How the Court Is Likely to Rule 
 Although Professor Fox and I have debated loss causation on an abstract level, the 
Supreme Court will likely resolve this issue on a far more pedestrian and doctrinal level, 
following an approach that it has laid out in earlier decisions. As the Court noted in 
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,34 Rule 10b-5 is a judicially 
fashioned, implied cause of action, one that Congress never really enacted. In such a 
context, the Court concluded, the scope and contours of this implied cause of action must 
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parallel the nearest similar express cause of action.35 In Lampf, Pleva, the Court found 
Sections 9 and 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to constitute the closest 
“comparable express remedial provisions,” and thus it looked to their statutes of 
limitations to determine the applicable statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5.  
 A brief examination of these two sections shows that both also contemplate that a 
plaintiff must prove loss causation. For example, Section 18 expressly authorizes a suit to 
be brought for a misleading statement in an SEC filing, but only by a person “who, in 
reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was 
affected by such a statement, for damages caused by such reliance ….”36 This language 
seems to require both traditional reliance and that the stock price be “affected” by the 
misstatement.37 Finally, because Section 18 limits recoverable damages to the “damages 
caused by such reliance,” it expressly requires a causal connection. But this language 
may not answer all questions. If the stock price was inflated by a misleading statement 
and has not fallen in response to any corrective disclosure, the plaintiffs will predictably 
claim that they have suffered “damages caused by such reliance” on the theory that the 
price inflation represents their “damages”. That such latent inflation constitutes 
recoverable “damages” seems dubious to me, but the statutory language is at least 
susceptible to divergent readings. 
 If Section 18 does not clearly resolve the issue of whether alleging price inflation 
is sufficient, it may answer a much more important question, because the express 
language of Section 18 permits the Court to reconsider Basic v. Levinson,38 which 
established the current doctrinal formula that the plaintiff in an efficient market relies on 
the “integrity of the price set by the market.”39 Because Section 18 expressly requires 
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actual reliance on the statement, itself, it follows that, if Section 18 is the appropriate 
template to which Rule 10b-5 must conform, then reliance on the “integrity of the price 
set by the market” would be insufficient to establish causation for Rule 10b-5 purposes.40 
 Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also contains similar language 
that requires that the plaintiff purchase or sell the “security at a price which was affected 
by such act or transaction.”41 Again, this language arguably could be read to cover price 
inflation without a subsequent market correction (i.e., the facts of Broudo), but Section 
9(e) does limit the damages recoverable to the “damages sustained as a result of any such 
act or transaction.”42 If the market has not corrected, it seems more questionable here 
than under Section 18 that the holder of stock at an inflated price has “sustained” any 
damages.43 
 In any event, the issue of loss causation under Rule 10b-5 is more directly 
addressed by the PSLRA, which added Section 21D(b)(4) to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. It provides: 
(4) Loss Causation. – In any private action arising under this title, the 
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the 
defendant alleged to violate this title caused the loss for which the plaintiff 
seeks to recover damages.44 
 
This provision clearly assigns the burden of proof on loss causation to the plaintiff. 
Hence, Professor Fox’s view that courts should create a presumption of causation based 
on a proper pleading of materiality reverses Congress’s allocation of the burden of proof. 
On the other hand, the above provision does not clearly state that proving price inflation 
is insufficient or that there must be a subsequent price decline following corrective 
disclosure. 
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 Still, Section 21D(b)(4) clearly intends to refer to an established doctrine called 
“loss causation.” The contours of this established doctrine are clearly set forth in Section 
548A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that: 
“one who misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation in order to 
sell its stock will become liable to a purchaser who relies upon the 
misinformation for the loss that he sustains when the facts as to the 
finances of the corporation become generally known and as a result the 
value of the shares is depreciated on the market.”45 
 
Clearly, this definition requires a market correction and is not satisfied simply by the 
claim that the stock price was inflated at the time of purchase.46 
 Two last statutory arguments may be more dispositive. First, Section 12(b) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 was added by the PSLRA at the same time as Section 21D(b)(4) 
was added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.47 It expressly disallows from the 
damages recoverable under Section 12 “any portion or all of the amount recoverable … 
other than the depreciation in value of the subject security resulting from such part of the 
prospectus or oral communication … not being true ….”48 In short, only the 
“depreciation in value,” not the original price inflation, can be recovered. Of course, 
Section 12 of the 1933 Act is addressing the primary market, not the secondary market 
addressed by Rule 10b-5 and Section 21D(b)(4). Yet, it seems self-evident that stricter 
standards should apply in the latter case where the defendant did not trade and is sued as 
a de facto insurer. After all, in both Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, the two primary 
market anti-fraud provisions, Congress placed the burden of disproving loss causation on 
the defendant,49 while in Section 21D(b)(4), which applies to Rule 10b-5, it squarely 
places that burden on the plaintiff. Although the burden of proof is different between the 
loss causation provisions in the two statutes, there is no reason to believe that Congress 
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wanted the concept of loss causation to be substantively different in the two statutes.50 If 
anything, Congress wanted loss causation to be a greater barrier to a plaintiff’s recovery 
under the 1934 Act than under the 1933 Act, which is why it assigned the burden of proof 
to the plaintiff under the 1934 Act. It would frustrate this intent, and indeed reverse the 
relative significance of the loss causation provision in the two statutes, if loss causation 
were defined not to require a post-purchase “depreciation in value” under the 1934 Act. 
Hence, Section 12(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 should be read in pari materia with 
Sections 21D(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 A second statutory argument flows out of Section 21(D)(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which was also added by the PSLRA in 1995, and which places a 
ceiling on damages so that they may not exceed the difference between the purchase price 
paid by the plaintiff (where the plaintiff is a buyer): 
“and the mean trading price of that security during the 90-day period 
beginning on the date on which the information correcting the 
misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is disseminated to 
the market.”51 
 
This language was expressly drafted to limit damages under Rule 10b-5 when the stock 
price rebounds after an initial decline (as it did in Broudo).52 Clearly, it assumes that 
there will be a market correction before there can be liability and then seeks to exclude 
short-term market corrections (probably because it considered them to be more the 
product of market volatility than actual fraud). Although this provision’s intent was to 
deny damages when there is an immediate price rebound, this language logically also 
precludes liability when there is no decline (even if the stock price remains “inflated”).53  
Conclusion 
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 When it is decided, Broudo could resolve a lot or only a little. It could reconsider 
Basic v. Levinson, which could be significantly curtailed in the light of the PSLRA and 
Lampf, Pleva.54 Or, the Court could simply accept the position of Solicitor General that 
the plaintiff must plead and prove some post-purchase decline in value of the security in 
order to satisfy loss causation. The Solicitor General’s position is extremely modest 
because it requires only that “the inflation in the price of the security attributable to the 
misrepresentation was eliminated or reduced.”55 That the inflation only need be 
“reduced” requires very little, and the Solicitor General’s brief even argues that “a drop 
in the stock price may not be a necessary condition for establishing loss causation in 
every fraud-on-the-market case.”56 Surprisingly, it goes even further to suggest that the 
“inflation attributable to a misrepresentation might be reduced or eliminated even if there 
were a net increase in price.”57 
 If this is all that the decision holds, its impact will be very modest indeed. Instead, 
the Court should rule that because Section 12(b) of the 1933 Act and Section 21D(b)(4) 
of the 1934 Act are to be read in tandem, there must be a stock price decline and only 
“depreciation in value” attributable to a material misstatement or omission can be 
recovered under Rule 10b-5, at least in the secondary market context of a company traded 
in an active securities market.58 
 The debate over Broudo and loss causation also shows the dangers in a shotgun 
marriage of law and economics. Procedure counts, and its goals and concerns tend to be 
excessively discounted by a purely ex ante approach to law and litigation. In particular, 
the concept of materiality means different things to lawyers and economists. Plugging a 
jury’s legal conclusion that an omitted fact was material into the framework of efficient 
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market theory makes little sense. Preserving judicial discretion and pre-trial screening of 
cases makes more sense, and the traditional loss causation doctrine does that, at least to a 
degree. Ultimately, the issue that most needs informed debate is the issue that will 
probably be ignored in the eventual Broudo decision:  the legitimacy of making the 
public corporation an insurer for market declines in open-market trading cases where the 
corporation, itself, has not traded. 
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there must be a post-purchase decline in price. In contrast, Section 21D(b)(4) places the burden of proof on 
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51 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e). 
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information and at the same time issued unrelated positive information.” Id. at 20. In truth, there seem to be 
some internal inconsistencies or at least tensions in the Solicitor General’s position. At page 15 of the Brief 
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at 15 and 19-21. This invites very speculative decision-making by the factfinder. One suspects that the SEC 
resisted any stronger position on loss causation.  
58 In thinner markets, rescissionary remedies may be appropriate, and that topic is not addressed in this 
brief comment. I recognize that the issue of damages is distinct from the issue of loss causation, but both 
Sections 11 and 12b limit damages to “depreciation in value,” and there is little reason to extend Rule 10b-
5 further in this context. Finally, in requiring a stock market decline, I do not mean to limit that decline to 
only those in response to a corrective statement by the corporation. The market may learn in other ways:  
Barron’s may publish an expose on the corporation’s accounting; short sellers may organize a bear raid on 
its stock – all these ways should count. 
